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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TESTED: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF “LANDSCAPE”
ERIC JAMES SELTZER†
INTRODUCTION
In August 2019, the College Board1 announced it was
launching a program providing higher education institutions
with “context about students’ high schools and neighborhoods
when making admissions decisions.”2 In August 2019, the
College Board announced it was launching “Landscape,” a
program providing higher education institutions with “context
about students’ high schools and neighborhoods when making
admissions decision.”3 Landscape collects and organizes data
into three categories—basic high school data, such as school
locale, test score comparison, and high school and neighborhood
indicators—that offers insight into high schools and
neighborhoods.4
Among these indicators are quintessential
measures of socioeconomic status, including college attendance,
household structure, median family income, housing stability,
education levels, and crime rate.5 To provide admissions officials
†
Senior Staff Member, St. John's Law Review, J.D., 2021, St. John's University
School of Law; B.A., 2016, Marist College. Thank you to Professor Rosa Castello for
her invaluable mentorship and guidance throughout the note-writing process and
beyond. I am also extraordinarily grateful for my biggest fans—mom and dad—who
have been by my side from day one. Their endless love and support means the world
to me, and I certainly would not be where I am today without them.
1
The College Board is an American not-for-profit organization that partners
with over 6,000 higher education institutions and administers standardized tests
assessing college readiness, including the SAT. About the College Board, COLL. BD.,
https://about.collegeboard.org/overview [https://perma.cc/B744-ZL6P] (last visited
Mar. 23, 2021).
2
Newsroom, College Board Announces Improved Admissions Resource, COLL. BD.
(Aug. 27, 2019) [hereinafter Newsroom], https://newsroom.collegeboard.org/collegeboard-announces-improved-admissions-resource [https://perma.cc/2BJE-BNNK].
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Landscape, College Board Announces Improved Admissions Resource, COLL.
BD., https://pages.collegeboard.org/landscape [https://perma.cc/4ABJ-77SS]
[hereinafter Improved Admissions Resource] (last visited Apr. 24, 2021).
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with “more consistent background information so they can fairly
consider every student, no matter where they live and learn,”
these six indicators are averaged and presented on a 1–100 scale
for both a student’s high school and neighborhood.6 A higher
score represents a “higher level of challenge related to
educational opportunities and outcomes”; a lower score indicates
less of a challenge in attaining academic success.7
This Note addresses potential Fourteenth Amendment8
challenges to the new Landscape profile. Although the College
Board’s efforts are laudable, Landscape raises several
constitutional
questions
because
of its
socioeconomic
classification system and similarity to past affirmative action
programs that were challenged on Equal Protection grounds.9
Before turning to these issues, Part I provides a descriptive
overview of Landscape and discusses the program’s origin,
evolution, and methodology. Part I concludes by summarizing
the prevailing criticisms of Landscape’s rating system, which
some have called an “adversity score.”10
Part II then offers a snapshot of modern Equal Protection
jurisprudence, which follows the oft-cited three-tiered framework
of strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis
review.11
Thereafter, Part II surveys the development of
affirmative action in higher education, beginning with the
landmark Regents of the University of California v. Bakke12
decision. Notably, almost all affirmative action cases since Bakke
have involved race and therefore have triggered strict scrutiny,
including the recently-decided Fisher v. University of Texas at
Austin case.13 However, several legal scholars suggest class-

6

Newsroom, supra note 2; Improved Admissions Resource, supra note 5.
Improved Admissions Resource, supra note 5.
8
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”).
9
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 307 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244, 245 (2003). Both cases involved race-based rather than class-based
affirmative action programs.
10
Anemona Hartocollis, SAT’s New ‘Adversity Score’ Will Take Students’
Hardships
into
Account,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
16,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/16/us/sat-score.html [https://perma.cc/U7Z3-VJPE].
11
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“In considering whether [a program]
violates the Equal Protection Clause . . . we apply different levels of scrutiny to
different types of classifications.”).
12
438 U.S. 265, 287–88, 356–57 (1978).
13
136 S.Ct. 2198, 2209–10 (2016).
7
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based affirmative action programs, which account for
socioeconomic disadvantage, could instead receive rational basis
review.14
After building on the necessary factual and legal background
in Parts I and II, Part III turns to the threshold requirement in
any Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection analysis,15 and
assesses whether the College Board, a private not-for-profit
organization, functions as a state actor because of its virtual
monopoly over the college admissions process. This Note argues
that, under the “entwinement test” established in Brentwood
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association,16
the College Board functions as a state actor because publiclyfunded institutions have historically developed an “entangled”
relationship with the College Board.
Part IV evaluates the constitutionality of Landscape under
the Equal Protection Clause, and argues rational basis review is
appropriate because Landscape uses indicators that depend
heavily on socioeconomic classifications.17
Alternatively, if
Landscape is framed in terms of geographic locale, courts would
still apply rational basis review.18 Next, this Note contends that
the College Board has a legitimate interest in providing schools
with consistent data reflective of students’ socioeconomic
upbringing because the Supreme Court of the United States
previously held diversity in higher education is a compelling
interest.19 Finally, despite criticism that Landscape is both
underinclusive and overinclusive, this Note concludes that the
program is rationally related to its proffered end.20
I. THE COLLEGE BOARD’S EFFORT TO DIVERSIFY HIGHER
EDUCATION
The acronym “SAT” is notorious.
college-bound students have taken

Since 1926, countless
the College Board’s

14
See, e.g., Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CALIF. L.
REV. 1037, 1037–38, 1060, 1064 (1996) [hereinafter Kahlenberg, Class-Based
Affirmative Action].
15
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) (“[T]he Fourteenth
Amendment . . . prohibits only state action.”).
16
531 U.S. 288, 314 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
17
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40–41 (1973).
18
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109–10 (2000).
19
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 307 (2003).
20
See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979).
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standardized test, the Scholastic Aptitude Test (“SAT”).21 In the
class of 2019, over 2.2 million students sat for the exam—a fourpercent increase from the class of 2018.22 This upward trend will
persist, as the College Board now offers free weekday testing
through the “SAT School Day” program.23 Simultaneously, the
test-taking population will become more diverse because SAT
School Day “makes the SAT possible for students who . . . could
not have tested on a weekend” by “eliminating barriers and
“[M]ore students,
simplifying the test-day experience.”24
regardless of background, are considering college as part of their
future.”25 Thus, the College Board has committed itself to other
initiatives that help colleges consider educational and
socioeconomic contexts in the application review process.
Landscape is one such initiative.
A.

Landscape’s Predecessor: The “Environmental Context
Dashboard”

In May 2019, the College Board announced a new initiative
to measure socioeconomic adversity through the Environmental
Originally, the
Context Dashboard (“the Dashboard”).26
Dashboard included information about a student’s high school,
comparative SAT scores, and contextual data on a student’s

21

See
Frontline,
A
Brief
History
of
the
SAT,
PBS,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sats/where/history.html
[https://perma.cc/8BU2-BWVU] (last visited Mar. 23, 2021); Inside the SAT Test,
COLL. BD., https://collegereadiness.collegeboard.org/sat/inside-the-test
[https://perma.cc/4AVV-27FY] (last visited Mar. 23, 2021).
22
SAT Results: Class of 2019, COLL. BD., https://reports.collegeboard.org/satsuite-program-results/class-2019-results [https://perma.cc/G44H-Q9WR] (last visited
Mar. 23, 2021).
23
See id. In 2018, thirty-six percent of students took the SAT on a school day.
Id. In 2019, forty-three percent of students took the SAT on a school day. Id.
24
Id. Compared to weekend test-takers, weekday test-takers are more likely to
have parents without high school diplomas or college degrees, identify as members of
a minority group, and attend “high-poverty public schools,” where over fifty percent
of the student body is eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. Id.
25
Id.
26
See Hartocollis, supra note 10; Dana Goldstein, Your Questions about the New
Adversity Score on the SAT, Answered, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/us/sat-adversity-score-explained.html
[https://perma.cc/D3MS-NGT7]. The Dashboard “allow[ed] colleges to incorporate context
into their admissions process in a data-driven, consistent way.” Frequently Asked
Questions: Environmental Context Dashboard, COLL. BD., [hereinafter Environmental
Context Dashboard FAQs] https://secure-media.collegeboard.org/pdf/environmentalcontext-dashboard-faqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/TU69-2CRN] (last visited Mar. 23, 2021).
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Percentage of households with
food stamps

Percentage of households with
food stamps

Percentage of families that are
single-parent families with
children and in poverty

Percentage of families that are
single-parent families with
children and in poverty

Percentage of families that are
single-parent families with
children

Percentage of families that are
single-parent families with
children

Percentage of housing units that
are rental

Percentage of housing units that
are rental

Percentage of housing units that
are vacant

Percentage of housing units that
are vacant

Rent as a percentage of income

Rent as a percentage of income

Percentage of adults with less
than a 4-year college degree

Percentage of adults with less
than a 4-year college degree

Percentage of adults with less
than a high school diploma

Percentage of adults with less
than a high school diploma

Percentage of adults with
agriculture jobs

Percentage of adults with
agriculture jobs

Percentage of adults with
nonprofessional jobs

Percentage of adults with
nonprofessional jobs

Percentage unemployed

Percentage unemployed

College-going behavior

College-going behavior

Probability of being a victim of a
crime

Figure 1: Contextual Data on the Neighborhood and High School
Environment
Each of the thirty-one factors were displayed as a percentile
between one and one-hundred, with a uniform distribution.31 A
score of “1” indicated the least amount of disadvantage, while a
score of “100” represented the most disadvantage in a particular
31
Id. A uniform distribution refers to a distribution with constant probability. James
Chen, Uniform Distribution, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/unifo
rm-distribution.asp [https://perma.cc/PNJ8-AM6Q] (last updated Feb. 2, 2021).
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category.32 The College Board then weighted the factors equally
to generate a scaled score for both the student’s high school and
neighborhood.33 This “Adversity Score” was available as a
percentile normed at the state and national levels.34 Again,
scores were displayed on a scale of one to one-hundred, with a
score of “50” representing an “average” level of socioeconomic
disadvantage.35

Figure 2: The Original Environmental Context Dashboard

32

Detailed Data Description, supra note 30.
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. Figure 2 depicts a hypothetical student’s Dashboard. Id. The
“Environmental Context” portion represented the “Adversity Score,” which provided
a scored “Overall Disadvantage Level.” Id.
33

226

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:219

Importantly, the Dashboard did not “directly reflect an
individual student;” all data was aggregate and pertained to the
census tract in which a student lived.36 Moreover, although the
program’s goal was to “find students who have transcended their
environments by examining factors that are correlated, according
to research, with lower academic achievement and lower lifetime
earnings,” none of the contextual measures included race or
ethnicity.37 The College Board elected for a holistic approach,
hoping to provide a “bigger package of data” about applicants.38
In developing the Dashboard, the College Board drew from
the research of economist Raj Chetty, who studied the impact of
neighborhood lifetime earnings on scholastic achievement.39 The
College Board also consulted with Richard D. Kahlenberg, a
Senior Fellow at the Century Foundation and proponent of classbased affirmative action.40 Kahlenberg recommended a measure
of socioeconomic disadvantage be included at the school and
neighborhood levels.41 Although Kahlenberg also believed the
Dashboard should have contained information about a student’s
family, he described the program as “an enormous step
forward.”42 During the program’s three-year pilot phase, colleges
and universities reported the Dashboard “made it easier to

36

Goldstein, supra note 26.
Id. (The Dashboard “contains no information on the student’s race or
ethnicity, or on the racial makeup of the student’s neighborhood or school.”)
38
Id.; see also Future Admissions Tools and Models Initiative, COLL. BD.,
https://professionals.collegeboard.org/higher-ed/future-admissions-tools-and-modelsinitiative [https://perma.cc/DG4G-B5CF] (last visited Mar. 23, 2021) (describing how
the Dashboard emphasized “holistic and individualized review”).
39
Goldstein, supra note 26; see generally Raj Chetty, et al., Where is the Land of
Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States, 129
Q. J. OF ECON. 1553 (2014).
40
Anemona Hartocollis & Amy Harmon, SAT Adversity Index: A Drive Toward
Diversity
Without
Discussing
Race,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
17,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/us/sat-adversity-race.html [https://perma.cc/TK4YGMAJ]. See generally RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996).
41
Richard D. Kahlenberg, An Imperfect SAT Adversity Score is Better than Just
Ignoring Adversity, THE ATLANTIC (May 25, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/id
eas/archive/2019/05/defense-sat-adversity-score/590278/ [https://perma.cc/5CX35X4P]. Kahlenberg argued that “an imperfect adversity score is better than failing to
account for the difficulty so many students overcome” because research found that “the
most disadvantaged students, on average, score a whopping 784 points lower on the
SAT . . . than the most advantaged.” Id.
42
Goldstein, supra note 26.
37
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incorporate contextual information,”43 which resulted in more
offers to low-income applicants.44
However, the Dashboard was not without its critics. First,
several education experts argued the Dashboard was
overgeneralized and should have included individualized student
data.45 One professor opined, “[i]f you’re a really well-educated,
higher-income family living in a poor neighborhood, this measure
is going to overstate the disadvantage you face.”46 Others
criticized the Dashboard for being underinclusive, insofar as the
SAT scores of low-income students living in wealthy
neighborhoods
or
attending
charter
schools
were
misrepresented.47
Second, many critics complained the Dashboard was a façade
for race-based affirmative action.48 One thinktank member
called the College Board’s plan “a back door to racial quotas in
college admissions”49 because housing patterns linked to race “are
not random, but are intentional, showing that race matters.”50
Still, some law professors believed the Dashboard’s failure to

43

Environmental Context Dashboard FAQs, supra note 26.
Goldstein, supra note 26.
45
Id.
46
Id.; see also Darin Bartram, New SAT ‘Adversity Score’ is Another College
Board Effort to Commodify My High Schooler, USA TODAY: VOICES,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/voices/2019/05/29/sat-adversity-scorecollege-board-unfair-column/1250576001/
[https://perma.cc/X2TK-JM3M]
(last
updated May 29, 2019, 5:49 PM). Bartram observed that students “whose parents
joined the trend toward gentrifying old, low-income neighborhoods may benefit from
historically high rates of crime, poverty and vacancy based on Census figures that do
not reflect the current environment.” Id.
47
Nick Anderson & Susan Svrluga, Coming Soon to the SAT: An ‘Adversity
Score’ Offering a Snapshot of Challenges Students Face, WASH. POST (May 16, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/05/16/coming-soon-sat-anadversity-score-offering-snapshot-challenges-students-face/ [https://perma.cc/Z85EVL28] (“[The Dashboard] doesn’t work well for, say, a low-income student on
scholarship at a New England boarding school . . . .”); contra Bartram, supra note 46
(“[S]tudents who leave their assigned high school to attend a magnet program at a
school in a more disadvantaged area . . . may find their adversity score inflated.”).
48
Scott Jaschik, College Board Will Add Adversity Score for Everyone Taking
the
SAT,
INSIDE
HIGHER
ED
(May
20,
2019),
https://www.insidehighered.com/admissions/article/2019/05/20/college-boardwill-add-adversity-score-everyone-taking-sat [https://perma.cc/8U2Y-9MGJ].
49
Id. (“[T]hanks to racial preferences, many black high school students know
they don’t need to put in as much scholarly effort as non-’students of color’ to be
admitted to highly competitive colleges. The adversity score will only reinforce that
knowledge.”).
50
Id.
44
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include race as an explicit factor was problematic.51 They
lamented “[n]ot having [racial] information is a true oversight if
you really are interested in understanding adversity.”52
B.

Landscape: What We Know and What We Don’t

Because of these criticisms, the College Board announced it
was abandoning the Dashboard in September 2019 and replacing
it with a new “transparent” initiative called Landscape, which
“no longer display[s] a single ‘score’ combining high school and
neighborhood information.”53 The College Board also reduced the
number of contextual factors from thirty-one to six.54
These changes aside, Landscape’s purpose and methodology
largely remains the same as its ill-fated predecessor.
Landscape’s goal is to provide “consistent high school and
neighborhood information for all [college] applicants to help
admissions officers fully consider every student, no matter where
they live.”55 The College Board again emphasizes Landscape is
“[o]nly one part of admissions” and does not alter a student’s SAT
score in any way.56 Similarly, Landscape does not replace other
traditional components of a student’s application, such as grade
point average, letters of recommendation, and personal
statements; the data therein is part of a holistic admissions
approach and no applicant can be “offered or denied admission
because of Landscape.”57 However, aside from a cursory list of

51

Goldstein, supra note 26.
Id. David Coleman, Chief Executive Officer of the College Board, responded
that race is less of a predictor of academic success than certain “resourcefulness”
factors: “It turns out in America that within every racial group . . . there are large
numbers of people who show resourcefulness within very limited circumstances.”
Hartocollis, supra note 10.
53
Newsroom, supra note 2.
54
Anemona Hartocollis, SAT ‘Adversity Score’ Is Abandoned in Wake of
Criticism, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/27/us/satadversity-score-college-board.html [https://perma.cc/C4AV-BNTD].
55
Landscape, Consistent High School and Neighborhood Information for
Colleges, COLL. BD., https://pages.collegeboard.org/landscape
[https://perma.cc/N94H-LZCE] (last visited Mar. 23, 2021). The College Board
offered the following justifications: Colleges typically “consider what students
achieved in the context of where they’ve learned and lived”; colleges can rely on
Landscape to fill information gaps because they receive applications from around the
world; and colleges benefit from consistency when making admissions decisions. Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
52
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state and national averages).59 High school characteristics
include locale (e.g. urban, suburban, rural), senior class size,
percent of students eligible for free and reduced-price lunch,
average SAT scores at colleges attended, and AP participation
and performance.60 The test score comparison displays students’
SAT scores within the range of test scores at their high schools.61
However, unlike the Environmental Context Dashboard,
which identified thirty-one unique contextual indicators,
Landscape contains “six key indicators about applicants’
communities and high schools.”62 These indicators are: college
attendance, household structure, median family income, housing
stability, education level, and crime rate.63 Although the College
Board no longer provides a single score for a student’s
59
Landscape, Consistent High School and Neighborhood Information for
Colleges, COLL. BD., https://secure-media.collegeboard.org/landscape/what-you-needto-know-counselors.pdf [https://perma.cc/85VD-HBTX] (last visited Mar. 23, 2021).
60
Landscape, Data and Methodology Summary 1, COLL. BD. (last visited Mar.
23, 2021), https://secure-media.collegeboard.org/landscape/data-methodologysummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XQD-QRT6]. Locale is based on high school location
and relies on NCES classifications. Id. Senior class size denotes the three-year
average graduating class size and is obtained from the NCES Common Core of Data
and Private School Survey. Id. The percent of students eligible for free or reduced
price lunch is also drawn from NCES, and the information is only available for
public schools. Id. Average SAT scores at colleges attended refers to the “[a]verage of
first-year student SAT scores at four-year colleges attended by the three most recent
cohorts of college-bound seniors from the applicant’s high school.” Id. AP
participation and performance includes the “[n]umber of seniors taking AP courses;
[the] average number of AP Exams taken per student; [the] average AP score; [and
the] number of unique [AP] exams administered.” Id.
61
Id. A student’s SAT score is presented alongside the twenty-fifth, fiftieth, and
seventy-fifth percentiles at the student’s high school, based on a three-year average.
Id.
62
Id. Like the Dashboard, neighborhood is defined by a student’s census tract,
and high school-level data incorporate the census tracts of seniors at a high school.
Id.
63
Comprehensive Data and Methodology Overview, supra note 27. College
attendance is “the predicted probability a student from the neighborhood/high school
enrolls in a four year college,” and is derived from “aggregate College Board and
National Student Clearinghouse data.” Id. Information about household structure is
obtained through ACS and considers the number of single parent, married, or
coupled families, and children living under the poverty line. Id. Median family
income is calculated among persons in the neighborhood/high school by the ACS. Id.
Housing stability includes ACS statistics about vacancy-rates, rental and home
ownership, and mobility/housing turnover. Id. Education level pertains to “[t]ypical
educational attainment in the neighborhood/high school” assessed by the ACS. Id.
Crime rate data is provided by Location.Inc, an online risk assessment tool, and is
defined as “[t]he predicted probability of being a victim of a crime in the
neighborhood or neighborhoods represented by the students attending the high
school.” Id.
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neighborhood and high school, the end result is practically the
same because these six indicators “are averaged and presented
on a 1–100 scale to provide a Neighborhood Average and High
School Average.”64 As was true of the Dashboard, “[a] higher
value on the 1–100 scale indicates a higher level of challenge
related to educational opportunities and outcomes.”65
One is left wondering whether there is any meaningful
difference between the Dashboard and its successor.
A
September 2019 letter to the editor puts the current state of
affairs into perspective:
If the College Board can bamboozle people into believing that its
“overall disadvantage level” has been materially changed by
calling it “Landscape,” the organization can boast that it can
fool practically all of the people all of the time. . . . Now, the
single number is gone, although colleges and universities can
distill the information into a, well, single number. Oh, and
Landscape is “transparent.”66

Landscape is undoubtedly controversial. In the coming years,
the College Board will likely become the target of various
lawsuits as Landscape attracts more public attention. If we are
to assess the legal viability of the program, we must combine
prescriptive precedent with contextual foresight to examine its
constitutionality.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER
EDUCATION
A.

Overview of Modern Equal Protection Jurisprudence

Equal Protection cases fall within a three-tiered framework
in which courts apply different levels of scrutiny to different
kinds of “classifications.”67 On one extreme, classifications based
on race receive the most exacting form of judicial scrutiny.68 To
withstand strict scrutiny, laws must be narrowly tailored to
compelling government interests.69 On the other extreme, laws
64

Id.
Id.
66
Richard E. Vatz, Opinion, Revamped SAT Plan, Same End Result, WASH.
POST (Sept. 1, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-sats-scale-fordisadvantaged-students-reeks-of-social-engineering/2019/09/01/e04a1830-ca95-11e99615-8f1a32962e04_story.html [https://perma.cc/M82F-K88G].
67
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
68
Id.
69
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
65
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involving other classifications—excluding gender—receive
rational basis review and must be “rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose.”70 Absent animus,71 courts will
uphold “imperfect” classification schemes “[i]n the area of
economics and social welfare.”72
If the socioeconomic
classification has “some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality.’ ”73
For example, in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, the plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of school-aged
minority children living in impoverished urban school districts
with a low property tax base.74 The plaintiffs argued Texas’
school finance system, which relied on local property taxation,
violated the Equal Protection Clause because “substantial
interdistrict disparities in school expenditures” perpetuated a
system of wealth-based discrimination.75
However, the Supreme Court held the school financing
system did not discriminate against any definable suspect class.76
The Court reasoned disparities in wealth are “large, diverse, and
amorphous” and the plaintiffs were “unified only by the common
factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable
wealth than other districts.”77 Furthermore, the Court observed
“[t]he system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines
have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is
not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment.”78
Therefore, the Court
determined the public-school finance system only needed to “bear
some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.”79 While

70
Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; see also Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348
U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
71
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
72
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
73
Id. (quoting Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
74
411 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1973).
75
Id. at 15.
76
Id. at 28.
77
Id. This “large” and “amorphous” class is comparable to the “large and
amorphous” class of persons with intellectual disabilities in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445–46 (1985). In Cleburne, the Court noted “it
would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups
who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others.” Id. at 445.
78
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
79
Id. at 40.
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the
state’s reliance on property taxation caused “some
inequality” in expenditures across school districts, the manner in
which Texas achieved its proffered rationale was “not alone a
sufficient basis for striking down the entire system.”80
The Court’s holding is unsurprising given the low threshold
for rational basis review.
Nevertheless, the Fourteenth
Amendment still requires “at least some assurance that the
rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental
fairness are satisfied.”81 Once a right to equal treatment is
recognized, later classifications affecting that right may not, “by
later arbitrary and disparate treatment,” value one group over
another.82 At its core, Equal Protection “applies as well to the
manner of [the right’s] exercise.”83 Therefore, classifications
which implicate another right to equal treatment—whether in
the context of ballot-counting84 or education85 across geographic
lines—should not be so arbitrary as to render them irrational.
Yet, “perfection is by no means required.”86
Even if a
classification “is to some extent both underinclusive and
overinclusive,” it will withstand rational basis review.87
B.

Race Based Affirmative Action in Higher Education

Although Landscape does not use racial classifications, a
brief review of analogous race-based affirmative action precedent
is necessary to establish a comparative legal framework. The
Court’s first encounter with affirmative action was Regents of the

80

Id. at 50–51.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000). The holding in Bush v. Gore was
narrow: “[h]aving once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not,
by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of
another.” Id. at 104–105. However, a broader principle can be extracted. Just as the
Fourteenth Amendment demands that votes are counted the same across county
lines, classifications based on neighborhood must be logically related to a legitimate
state interest.
82
Id. at 104.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 104-05.
85
The Court has never recognized a fundamental right to education, Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982), but did recognize a right to equal treatment in public
educational institutions. In Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), the
Court emphasized “the importance of education to our democratic society” and
recognized that “[s]uch an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it,
is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”
86
Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Sch. Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 385 (1960).
87
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979).
81
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University of California v. Bakke,88 which struck down a state
medical school’s voluntary affirmative action program that
reserved sixteen seats in the entering class for minority
applicants.89 The Court held the university’s racial quota system
was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause because
it “totally excluded [non-minorities] from a specific percentage of
the seats in an entering class.”90
In the subsequent Grutter and Gratz decisions, the Court
clarified the constitutional status of racial admissions
preferences. In Grutter v. Bollinger, University of Michigan Law
School applicants who were denied admission challenged the
university’s race-conscious admissions policy which sought to
enroll a “critical mass” of minority students to promote “racial
and ethnic diversity.”91 Yet, the policy did not “define diversity
‘solely in terms of racial and ethnic status.’ ”92 The school
provided a “flexible assessment of applicants’ talents,
experiences, and potential” by considering LSAT scores, gradepoint averages, personal statements, and letters of
recommendation.93
Accordingly, the Court upheld the law school’s admissions
policy.94 The Court conceded race-based affirmative action
programs, though remedial, must receive strict scrutiny.95
However, “[s]trict scrutiny is not ‘strict in theory, but fatal in
fact.’ ”96
Race-based affirmative action programs are
constitutional provided they are narrowly tailored to a
compelling state interest.97 In this spirit, the Court noted the

88

438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id. at 271, 289.
90
Id. at 319 (“No matter how strong their qualifications, quantitative and
extracurricular, including their own potential for contribution to educational
diversity, [non-minorities] are never afforded the chance to compete with applicants
from the preferred groups.”).
91
539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003). The Director of Admissions testified “ ’ ”critical
mass” means “meaningful numbers” or “meaningful representation,” ’ . . . a number
that encourages underrepresented minority students to participate in the classroom
and not feel isolated.” Id. at 318.
92
Id. at 316.
93
Id. at 315.
94
Id. at 343–44 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law
School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling
interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student
body.”).
95
Id. at 326.
96
Id. (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)).
97
Id. at 327.
89
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important role of education and reiterated Bakke’s presumption
of deference to “complex” academic judgements.98 For the first
time, the Court explicitly held a university’s “interest in
attaining a diverse student body” was compelling.99
Furthermore, the Court held the Law School’s policy was
sufficiently narrowly tailored because, unlike the quota system in
Bakke, the program did not admit “some specified percentage of a
particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin.”100
Instead, race and ethnicity were “plus” factors101 in the otherwise
individualized, holistic consideration of each applicant’s file.102
However, the Court arrived at the opposite conclusion about
the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions policy in
Gratz v. Bollinger.103 Like the admissions policy in Grutter, the
admissions policy in Gratz considered factors such as an
applicant’s grades and standardized test scores.104 Yet, unlike
the admissions policy in Grutter, the policy in Gratz used
“predetermined point allocations”105 and guaranteed admission to
applicants receiving a score of one-hundred points or greater.106
Students from underrepresented racial and ethnic groups were
automatically awarded twenty points.107 Consequently, “virtually

98
Id. at 328–29; accord Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319,
n.53 (1978).
99
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. The Court was “informed by [its] view that attaining
a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper institutional
mission.” Id. at 329.
100
Id. at 329; contra Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (an admissions policy which uses
quotas to “insulat[e] each category of [racial and ethnic minority] applicants with
certain desired qualifications from competition with all other applicants” is not
narrowly tailored).
101
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
102
Id. at 337 (“[T]he Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic
review of each applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an
applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment. The Law School
affords this individualized consideration to applicants of all races.”).
103
539 U.S. 234, 275 (2003) (“[B]ecause the University’s use of race . . . is not
narrowly tailored to achieve [the] asserted compelling interest in diversity, the
admissions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”).
104
Id. at 253.
105
Id. at 279 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
106
Id. at 255 (majority opinion). Applicants could receive a maximum of onehundred-and-fifty points on a selection index that was divided into the following
ranges: “100–150 (admit); 95–99 (admit or postpone); 90–94 (postpone or admit); 75–
89 (delay or postpone); 74 and below (delay or reject).” Id.
107
Id. at 244 (“[E]very applicant from an underrepresented racial or ethnic
minority group is automatically awarded 20 points of the 100 needed to guarantee
admission.”).
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every qualified . . . [minority] applicant” was admitted to the
University’s undergraduate program.108
Although the Court recognized a compelling interest in
attaining a critical mass of racially diverse students,109 it
nonetheless held that the University’s policy was not sufficiently
narrowly tailored.110 The Court reasoned each applicant must be
evaluated on an individualized basis, and the admissions
program must assess “all of the qualities [an] individual
possesses, and in turn, evaluat[e] [an] individual’s ability to
contribute to the unique setting of higher education.”111 The
University’s admissions policy did not provide the requisite
“individualized
consideration”
because
its
mechanical,
predetermined points system awarded twenty points to an
applicant’s race or ethnicity—one-fifth of the points needed to
This practice “ensure[d] that the
guarantee admission.112
diversity contributions of applicants [could not] be individually
assessed,” and was therefore unconstitutional.113
Several years later, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to
the Grutter-Gratz framework in Fisher v. University of Texas at
Austin.114 In Fisher II, the University of Texas automatically
admitted the top ten-percent of high school students graduating
from their class,115 and filled the remaining seats by combining
an applicant’s SAT score and grade point average with a
“Personal Achievement Index” 116 (PAI)—a scaled number
between “1” and “6” that was comprised of the average score on
two essays and a separate review of these essays along with
supplemental information including an applicant’s resume,
letters of recommendation, and “special circumstances.”117
Among the special circumstances that the University considered
were:
108

Id. at 254.
Id. at 268; accord Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327–33 (2003).
110
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (“[T]he University’s policy, which automatically
distributes 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to
every single ‘underrepresented minority’ applicant solely because of race, is not
narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity . . . .”).
111
Id. at 271; accord Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315
(1978).
112
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271–72.
113
Id. at 279 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
114
136 S.Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016).
115
Id. at 2205.
116
Id. at 2206.
117
Id.
109
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[T]he socioeconomic status of the applicant’s family, the
socioeconomic status of the applicant’s school, the applicant’s
family responsibilities, whether the applicant lives in a singleparent home, the applicant’s SAT score in relation to the
average SAT score at the applicant’s school . . . and, finally, the
applicant’s race.118

The Court acknowledged the University could consider race
as “a positive feature of a minority student’s application” and
found race was but a “factor within a factor” in the holistic review
process.119 Thus, consistent with Grutter,120 the Court held PAI
was narrowly tailored to “the decision to pursue ‘the educational
benefits that flow from student body diversity’ ”121 because the
plaintiffs did not proffer an “available” and “workable” raceneutral alternative.122
Fisher II is the Court’s final word on the constitutionality of
race-based affirmative action programs in higher education.
However, class-based affirmative action programs have received
little judicial attention despite discussion in the legal
community.123 After reviewing relevant scholarship, this Note
returns to the question of whether Landscape would survive an
Equal Protection challenge.
C.

The Viability of Class-Based Affirmative Action

Several legal scholars have suggested alternatives to
For
traditional race-based affirmative action programs.124
118

Id. PAI is similar to the College Board’s Landscape profile in many respects.
Id. at 2207.
120
539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003) (“[N]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of
every conceivable race-neutral alternative.”).
121
Fisher II, 136 S.Ct. at 2208 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 570
U.S. 297, 310 (2013)). Although “an interest in the educational benefits of diversity”
is compelling, the interest “cannot be elusory or amorphous.” Id. at 2211. Instead, a
university’s goals “must be sufficiently measurable to permit judicial scrutiny of the
policies adopted to reach them.” Id. The Court found the University “articulated
concrete and precise goals” and provided a “reasoned, principled explanation” for
pursing them. Id.
122
Id. at 2214. Narrow tailoring “impose[s] ‘on the university the ultimate
burden of demonstrating’ that ‘race-neutral alternatives’ that are both ‘available’
and ‘workable’ ‘do not suffice.’ ” Id. at 2208 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at
Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 312 (2013)). However, the plaintiff’s suggested alternative—an
admissions system using class rank as the sole metric—was not “available” and
“workable” for the University. Id. at 2213–14.
123
See infra Section II.C.
124
See, e.g., Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 14; Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 1913, 1914–15 (1996).
119
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example, Richard Kahlenberg has written extensively about the
merits of a class-based affirmative action system that “recognizes
the very real legacy of discrimination, but also acknowledges that
there are better, more productive ways of addressing that legacy
than through the use of racial preferences.”125
First, Kahlenberg argues class-based affirmative action is
morally justified because it more effectively provides equal
opportunity than typical race-based programs.126 Children who
are born into poverty—even those who are “just as naturally
talented and hard working” as their peers—have less economic
prosperity and social mobility than children born in the upper
classes.127
In this vein, Kahlenberg claims class-based
affirmative action could “indirectly compensate for past
discrimination, bring about natural integration, and provide a
bridge to a color-blind future.”128 Whereas racial preferences
benefit wealthy racial minorities, class preferences “adjust for
the latent potential of those who have faced obstacles and done
fairly well nonetheless.”129
Second, Kahlenberg justifies class-based affirmative action
because of what he calls the “great legal irony.”130 Unlike racebased programs, which trigger strict scrutiny,131 class-based
programs “provide a constitutional way to achieve greater racial
and ethnic diversity[ ] because they do not [involve] a suspect
category . . . .”132 Today, “most of the racial laws being subjected
to strict scrutiny are not those that hurt people of color,” but
instead are “remedies intended to help them.”133 Therefore,
rational basis review provides class-based affirmative action

125

Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 14, at 1037–38.
Id. at 1060.
127
Id. at 1060–61 (citing a 1979 study finding children born into the wealthiest
fifth of society could expect to earn anywhere from 150 percent to 186 percent of the
national average, whereas children born into the least advantaged fifth could expect
to earn only 56 percent to 67 percent of the national average).
128
Id. at 1060.
129
Id. at 1061.
130
Id. at 1064.
131
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[W]e hold
today that all racial classifications . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny.”). Kahlenberg warned that the Adarand decision could be disastrous
for race-based affirmative action programs. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative
Action, supra note 14, at 1039.
132
Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 14, at 1064.
133
Id.
126
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programs with a legal viability that race-based programs do not
enjoy.134
Kahlenberg also illustrates how class-based affirmative
action programs would function in practice. He dispels criticism
about the “difficulties of measuring disadvantage”135 and
articulates three principles that should guide class-based
programs.136 First, the system must emphasize “genuine equality
of opportunity, where natural talents may flourish in their full
potential.”137 When individuals demonstrate potential to succeed
despite socioeconomic impediments, society should invest in their
personal development.138
Second, the system must be
administrable and use verifiable information including parental
income, education, and occupation.139 Finally, the program must
be “politically palpable.”140 The strongest support for class-based
affirmative action would likely occur at early “meritocratic crisis
points,” such as when disadvantaged students apply to college.141
Crucial to Kahlenberg’s proposal is the definition of
socioeconomic “class.”142 Kahlenberg outlines simple, moderate,
and sophisticated definitions.143 The simple definition uses
family income as the sole indicia of socioeconomic status, which is
easily ascertained by reviewing tax returns.144 The moderate
definition also accounts for parental income, education, and
occupation.145
The sophisticated definition considers these
134

See id.
Id. at 1065. The Citizens’ Commission for Civil Rights cautioned “ ‘[t]he
difficulties of measuring disadvantage seem insurmountable’ ” and The National
Women’s Law Center objected “ ‘[t]here isn’t one simple or generally accepted way to
identify or determine ‘need.’ ” Id. n.150.
136
Id. at 1066.
137
Id.
138
Id. (“[W]e should create an obstacles test, which says that if a given
individual did quite well, despite various impediments, then she is very talented
and/or very hardworking; she deserves an edge because she has great long-run
potential.”). The College Board’s rhetoric mirrors Kahlenberg’s first principle. See
Hartocollis, supra note 10.
139
Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 14, at 1066.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 1067 (“[C]lass preferences make sense in the university admissions
process . . . because applicants are still generally young. In many ways,
colleges . . . are the modern gatekeepers, deciding who gets ahead and who does
not . . . .”).
142
See id. at 1073.
143
Id. at 1074.
144
Id. (noting that “income is a good proxy for a whole host of economic
disadvantages (such as bad schools, or a difficult learning environment).”).
145
Id. at 1075.
135
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factors, as well as net worth, quality of secondary education,
neighborhood influences, and family structure.146 Kahlenberg
favors the sophisticated definition because the multiplicity of
factors reduces the likelihood of fraud or manipulation.147
Furthermore, the sophisticated definition is administrable: “Its
use is most compelling in the context of university admissions”
because “admissions officials already have access to a wealth of
information.”148
Landscape, which is partially the invention of Kahlenberg,149
provides colleges with an ideal alternative to race-conscious
admissions by incorporating factors from his “sophisticated
definition” of socioeconomic class.150 Furthermore, Landscape
comports with Kahlenberg’s policy principles for class-based
preferences.151 The program’s purpose—to provide “consistent
high school and neighborhood information for all applicants to
help [colleges] fully consider every student, no matter where they
live”152—emphasizes “genuine equality of opportunity.”153
Likewise, the program is administrable because it uses verifiable
census tract data.154 Landscape appears to be “just right,”
however the Goldilocks principle155 is not used to resolve Equal
Protection disputes. If Landscape is to withstand constitutional
scrutiny, it must be evaluated within the Fourteenth
Amendment’s three-tiered framework.
The first inquiry is
whether the state action requirement is satisfied.
146
Id. at 1078. Wealth correlates with annual income; net worth “accumulates
over time” and fills gaps. Id. Quality of education is objectively quantified by
considering “readily available figures, such as the percentage of students at each
school who receive free or reduced price lunches, mean test scores on standardized
tests, and/or per pupil expenditure.” Id. at 1079. Neighborhood influences are
measured by zip code or census tract, and include the percentage of households
living in poverty, median family income, average unemployment, the percentage of
female-headed households, and crime rate. Id. at 1080–81. Family structure
primarily refers to “the absence or presence of two parents” Id. at 1081.
147
Id. at 1083.
148
Id.
149
Kahlenberg, supra note 41.
150
Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 14, at 1078;
Comprehensive Data and Methodology Overview, supra note 27.
151
See supra notes 142–148 and accompanying text.
152
Improved Admissions Resource, supra note 5.
153
Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 14, at 1066.
154
Improved Admissions Resource, supra note 5.
155
The Goldilocks principle states “something must fall within certain margins,
as opposed to reaching extremes.” Judith Curry, The Goldilocks Principle, CLIMATE,
ETC. (Dec. 22, 2012), https://judithcurry.com/2012/12/22/the-goldilocks-principle/
[https://perma.cc/3HVA-SHKJ].
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III. CROSSING THE THRESHOLD: THE COLLEGE-BOARD AS A STATE
ACTOR
This Note argues the College Board functions as a state actor
because of its “entwined” relationship with state and publiclyfunded institutions. Generally, the Constitution prohibits only
governmental infringement of Fourteenth Amendment rights; to
bring a constitutional challenge, the alleged discriminatory
activity must be attributed to a state actor.156 However, private
conduct can be brought within the purview of the Equal
Protection Clause provided the state is significantly involved in
the discriminatory action.157 In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Association,158 the Court developed an
“entwinement” test and found a not-for-profit athletic association
that regulated sports among public and private high schools
functioned as a state actor because of its entangled relationship
with the state.159 The Court held “[e]ntwinement will support a
conclusion that an ostensibly private organization ought to be
charged with a public character and judged by constitutional
standards.”160
Though the underlying legal challenges in Brentwood are
outside of this Note’s scope,161 the Court articulated “[t]he
nominally private character of the Association is overborne by
the pervasive entwinement of public institutions . . . in its
composition and workings, and there is no substantial reason to
claim unfairness in applying constitutional standards to it.”162
The Court emphasized the Association was “an organization
of . . . public schools to the extent of 84% of the total.”163
Moreover, interscholastic athletics played “an integral part” in

156
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (“[T]he action inhibited by the
[Equal Protection Clause] of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may
fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.”).
157
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (“[P]rivate
conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal Protection Clause
unless to some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been
found to have become involved . . . .”).
158
531 U.S. 288 (2001).
159
Id. at 302.
160
Id.
161
Brentwood Academy, a private high school, brought a § 1983 suit against the
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association after the Association initiated a
regulatory enforcement proceeding against the school. Id. at 291–93.
162
Id. at 298.
163
Id.
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public education because participating teams needed “some
mechanism to produce rules and regulate competition.”164
Although “the 16% minority of private school memberships”
prevented total entanglement with the public school system, “the
entwinement up from the member public schools [was]
overwhelming.”165 Thus, the Court concluded the Association
should be treated as a state actor.166
Here, the Brentwood entwinement test is applicable to the
College Board⎯a private, not-for-profit organization.167
Although the Fourteenth Amendment “erects no shield against
merely private conduct,”168 the College Board’s activities can be
brought within the Amendment’s scope provided that the “[s]tate
in any of its manifestations has . . . become involved” in its
affairs.”169 In Tarkanian, the Court acknowledged “[a] state
university without question is a state actor.”170 Also beyond
question is the fact that thousands of state and publicly-funded
colleges and universities utilize the SAT—several of which
participated in Landscape’s pilot program (Florida State
University,171 Yale University, and Duke University172). This
number will continue to grow, as the College Board expands
Landscape to 150 schools for the 2019–2020 schoolyear and
prepares to make the program “broadly available” in the

164

Id. at 299.
Id. at 300, 302.
166
Id. at 299–300 (“[T]o the extent of 84% of its membership, the Association is
an organization of public schools represented by their officials acting . . . to provide
an integral element of secondary public schooling.”); contra Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 198–99 (1988) (“[E]ven if we assume that a private
monopolist can impose its will on a state agency . . . it does not follow that such a
private party is therefore [a state actor].”).
167
About the College Board, supra note 1.
168
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721 (1961).
169
Id. at 722.
170
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192.
171
Jaschick, supra note 48. Florida State University is a senior member of the
State University of System of Florida and receives funding directly from Florida’s
state legislature. See Amy Farnum-Patronis, Florida State University Joins Nation’s
Top
20,
FLA.
STATE
UNIV.
NEWS
(Sept.
9,
2019),
https://news.fsu.edu/news/university-news/2019/09/09/florida-state-university-joinsnations-top-20 [https://perma.cc/P35M-EHU5].
172
Anderson & Svrluga, supra note 47. Yale University and Duke University
receive funding from the federal government. The US Colleges That are the Best at
Getting Government Funding and are Secure for the Future, BEST VALUE SCH. (Dec.
18, 2020), https://www.bestvalueschools.com/rankings/government-funded-colleges
[https://perma.cc/BSW9-LE6Q].
165
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future.173 Given the public character of these institutions, the
question becomes whether state action can be imputed to the
College Board.
Under the Brentwood entwinement test, the answer is a
resounding “yes.” Although the College Board is “an ostensibly
private organization,” it “ought to be charged with a public
character and judged by constitutional standards” because of its
entanglement with state and publicly-funded institutions174 and
its virtual “monopoly” over college admissions.175 Like the
Association in Brentwood, the College Board deals extensively
with state and publicly-funded universities.176 Furthermore,
thousands of public high schools also conduct business with the
College Board,177 a factor not present in Brentwood.
If
“entwinement up from . . . public schools is overwhelming,”
private actors must answer for Fourteenth Amendment
violations.178 This is especially true of education, because, as
recognized by the Court in Brown , “education is perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments.”179
Similarly, just as the Association in Brentwood played “an
integral part” in public education because teams needed “some
mechanism to produce rules and regulate competition,”180 the
College Board serves an important, if not necessary, function in
the college admissions process. Although several institutions
have decided to follow a “test[-]optional” approach, the SAT
remains the paramount assessment of college readiness and
provides a “common yardstick” for evaluating a diverse pool of
applicants.181 Moreover, even if schools choose to abandon the
173
Improved Admissions Resource, supra note 5 (“In 2018–19 we piloted the
dashboard with more than 50 colleges and universities. This year we anticipate
between 100 and 150 colleges will participate in the pilot. Beginning in fall 2020, we
plan to make the resource broadly available to colleges and universities for free.”).
174
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 302
(2001).
175
How Much Does the College Board Make off the SAT and AP Exams?, FIN.
SAMURAI,
https://www.financialsamurai.com/how-much-does-the-college-boardmake-off-the-sat-and-ap-exams/ [https://perma.cc/96SW-LX8G] (last visited Mar. 24,
2021).
176
See supra notes 158–166 and accompanying text.
177
See The SAT and SAT Subject Tests Domestic Code List, COLL. BD. 4–30
(2020), https://collegereadiness.collegeboard.org/pdf/sat-domestic-code-list.pdf.
178
Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 302.
179
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
180
Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 299.
181
Jaschick, supra note 48; Scott Jaschick, More Colleges Go Test Optional in
Admissions,
INSIDE
HIGHER
ED.
(Apr.
1,
2019,
3:00
AM),
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SAT, test-optional institutions can still participate in
Landscape.182 By choosing to follow Landscape’s uniform scoring
system, admissions officials at these schools unquestionably
delegate copious amounts of private authority to the College
Board. Accordingly, the College Board is at least “pervasively
entwined” with public institutions and must be treated as a state
actor.183
IV. LANDSCAPE TESTED: EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
In light of established Equal Protection jurisprudence, the
constitutional status of Landscape is initially unclear. On one
hand, Landscape shares many characteristics with traditional
race-based affirmative action programs that receive the “most
exacting form of judicial examination.”184 On the other hand,
Landscape is not about race.185 At its core, Landscape embodies
the tenets of a class-based affirmative action program.186
Therefore, this Note argues Landscape should receive rational
basis review. As Kahlenberg predicted, the “great legal irony”187
provides the College Board’s well-intentioned program with
sufficient legitimacy to survive a Fourteenth Amendment
challenge.
A.

The Argument Against Strict Scrutiny Review

Because of the Supreme Court’s tendentious Adarand
decision, all race-based affirmative action programs demand
strict scrutiny.188 On its face, Landscape seems to fall outside the
scope of Adarand because it does not contain information about a
student’s race or ethnicity, or about the racial makeup of a

https://www.insidehighered.com/admissions/article/2019/04/01/more-colleges-go-testoptional-admissions [https://perma.cc/9Q5D-QT4M].
182
Improved Admissions Resource, supra note 5 (“Several test-optional
institutions participated in the pilot and continue to participate.”).
183
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 442 F.3d 410, 419
(6th Cir. 2006).
184
Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978).
185
Goldstein, supra note 26.
186
See supra notes 149–153 and accompanying text.
187
Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 14, at 1064.
188
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[W]e hold
today that all racial classifications . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny.”); see also Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note
14, at 1038–39.
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student’s neighborhood and school.189 However, in Washington v.
Davis,190 the Court held that a policy “otherwise neutral on its
face, must not be applied so as . . . to discriminate on the basis of
race.”191 In other words, the policy cannot “be traced to a racially
discriminatory purpose,”192 that is “inferred from the totality of
the relevant facts, including . . . that the [policy] bears more
heavily on one race.”193 However, facially-neutral policies are not
unconstitutional “simply because [they] may affect a greater
proportion of one race.”194 “Disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but . . . [s]tanding alone, it does not trigger the
rule . . . that racial classifications are to be subjected to the
strictest scrutiny.”195 Consequently, subsequent jurisprudence
has been confined to “simplistic search[es] for a smoking gun—
individual bad actors intentionally doing bad things.”196
Here, the evidence fails to reveal a “smoking gun.”197 To the
contrary, the College Board explicitly rejects the use of race in its
calculus.198 Chief Executive Officer David Coleman recently
described why socioeconomic status is a better predictor of
academic success than race: “It turns out in America that within
every racial group . . . there are large numbers of people who
show resourcefulness within very limited circumstances.”199
Indeed, skeptics have criticized Landscape as a “half-hearted
effort to measure hardship” because it excludes information about
the racial composition of a student’s community.200
189

Goldstein, supra note 26.
See generally 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In Washington v. Davis, African Americans
who were denied police officer positions brought suit claiming the department’s
recruiting procedures, including a written test, were discriminatory. See id. at 232–
34.
191
Id. at 241.
192
Id. at 240.
193
Id. at 242.
194
Id.
195
Id. (disproportionate impact “is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole
touchstone of . . . racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution”).
196
Osagie K. Obasogie, Opinion, The Supreme Court Is Afraid of Racial
Justice,
N.Y.
T IMES
(June
7,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/07/opinion/the-supreme-court-is-afraid-of-racialjustice.html.
197
See id.; see also supra Part I. Sources consulted included the College Board’s
website, press releases, and official statements to media outlets.
198
Hartocollis, supra note 10.
199
Id.
200
André J. Washington & Daniel Hemel, By Omitting Race, the SAT’s New
Adversity Score Misrepresents Reality, TIME (May, 21 2019, 4:00 PM),
https://time.com/5592661/sat-test-adversity-score-race/ (“The [College Board] has
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Similarly, because Landscape is still in its pilot phase,201
there is no statistical evidence of disproportionate racial impact.
However, assuming Landscape ultimately results in “a back door
to racial quotas in college admissions”202 because neighborhood
structures and housing patterns are linked to race,203 a faciallyneutral policy will not receive strict scrutiny “simply because it
may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.”204
Even if Landscape disproportionately benefits minorities, a
“smoking gun” statement from a College Board official is still
necessary.205 Absent such a statement, Landscape should not
receive strict scrutiny.
B.

The Argument for Rational Basis Review

Because Landscape measures a student’s level of challenge
using contextual high school and neighborhood indicators that
depend heavily on socioeconomic classifications, rational basis
review is appropriate.206 For the reasons discussed in Part II.C,
Landscape fits the mold of a class-based affirmative action
program. The six contextual indicators—college attendance,
household structure, median family income, housing stability,
education
level,
and
crime—align
with
Kahlenberg’s
207
“sophisticated” definition of class.
Although Rodriguez
examined the constitutionality of an alleged class-based
discriminatory policy, Kahlenberg convincingly argues remedial
class-based affirmative action programs should receive the same

conspicuously omitted a central factor shaping the lives of college applicants: race.
As a result, a metric designed to guide admissions officers in their consideration of
adversity threatens to mislead instead.”). See also Goldstein, supra note 26 (“Not
having [racial] information is a true oversight if you really are interested in
understanding adversity.”).
201
Improved Admissions Resource, supra note 5 (“In 2018-19 we piloted the
dashboard with more than 50 colleges and universities. This year we anticipate
between 100 and 150 colleges will participate in the pilot.”).
202
Jaschick, supra note 48.
203
Id. (“Centuries of racial animus and legislation have created and maintained
steady segregation of wealth and educational accumulation. Decades of housing
policy, practice and legislation have made sure that there are ‘good’ and ‘bad’
neighborhoods, where tax distribution and local funding separation has ensured the
steady maintenance of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ schools.”).
204
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
205
See id. at 241.
206
Classifications based on socioeconomic status do not operate to the
disadvantage of an articulable suspect class. San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
207
Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 14, at 1078–83.
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status because socioeconomic classifications, regardless of
discriminatory intent, do not affect the rights of an articulable
suspect class.208 As a result, heightened scrutiny is unnecessary.
Similarly, even if Kahlenberg’s argument is unavailing,
Landscape would still receive rational basis review because the
program extrapolates from geographic data to provide admissions
officials with background about students’ educational prospects.
The dicta in Bush v. Gore is illustrative. At a minimum, all
classifications require “at least some assurance that the
rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental
fairness are satisfied.”209 Arbitrary and irrational classifications
are unconstitutional, particularly when these classifications
impact other recognized rights.210 Brown implicitly recognized a
right to equal treatment in educational institutions.211 Thus,
Landscape cannot favor certain neighborhoods at the expense of
others on the basis of random choice or personal whim.
Nevertheless, “perfection is by no means required” to survive
rational basis review.212 Landscape is constitutional so long as
its methodology is rationally related to some legitimate
purpose.213
To reiterate, the purpose of Landscape is to recruit
socioeconomically disadvantaged college applicants who have
“transcended their environments” by providing admissions
officials with consistent background data reflective of their high
schools and neighborhoods.214 The College Board asserts that
contextual information is necessary because colleges typically
“consider what students achieved in the context of where they[ ]
learn[ ] and live[ ].”215 Because the Grutter Court previously
recognized a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student
body,216 the College Board unquestionably has a legitimate
interest in the same. In his recent address, Chief Executive
208

See supra Section II.C.
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Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep. Sch. Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 385 (1960).
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See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
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Goldstein, supra note 26.
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Improved Admissions Resource, supra note 5. The College Board’s
justification resembles the University of Michigan’s “critical mass” rationale in
United States v. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003).
216
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
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Officer Coleman highlighted the importance of diversity in
college admissions:
Merit is all about resourcefulness . . . . This is about finding
young people who do a great deal with what they’ve been given.
It helps colleges see students who may not have scored as high
[on the SAT], but when you look at the environment they have
emerged from, it is amazing.217

The College Board understands the “educational benefits
that flow from student body diversity,”218 and “remain[s] mindful
that diversity takes many forms” other than “[f]ormalistic racial
classifications.”219 For this reason, the College Board “tailor[ed]
its approach in light of changing circumstances,” through
“regular evaluation of data and consideration of student
experience.”220 After receiving feedback about its pilot program,
the College Board made several methodological changes to
Landscape by eliminating the single “adversity score” combining
high school and neighborhood information, and reducing the
number of contextual factors from thirty-one to six.221
Additionally, the College Board’s interest in diversity is neither
“elusory” nor “amorphous;” it articulates “concrete and precise
goals” and provides a “reasoned, principled explanation” for
pursuing them.222 Because the record does not contain evidence
of animus towards a particular socioeconomic class,223 the
proffered purpose of Landscape is, at the very least, legitimate.
Next, Landscape’s methodology must be rationally related to
the College Board’s interest in student body diversity.224 In other
words, the “high school” and “neighborhood indicators” cannot be
so arbitrary and irrational that they lack a discernible connection
to Landscape’s purpose.225 Although Landscape is concededly
imperfect (like many other policies that have withstood judicial
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Fisher v. Univ. Tex. Austin, 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2208 (quoting Fisher v. Univ.
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scrutiny),226 it is part of a holistic initiative similar to the
admissions policy in Grutter.227 The College Board emphasizes
that Landscape is only one part of admissions and provides
colleges with a package of data about applicants by collecting
information from reliable sources, including the NCES and the
ACS.228 This information is then organized into “high school” and
“neighborhood” “indicators,” which account for students who
attend institutions other than their designated public high
schools.229
Landscape also, however, shares characteristics with the
admissions policy in Gratz because it assigns predetermined
numerical values to information about an applicant’s
socioeconomic status; these numbers are averaged together to
produce an aggregate score from 1–100.230 Yet, unlike the policy
in Gratz, Landscape does not effectuate a bonus system that
guarantees admission.231
Thus, Landscape lies somewhere
between the admissions systems in Grutter and Gratz—a
“mechanical plus factor” of sorts. The Court has not ruled on the
constitutionality of this type of program,232 but Landscape would
still survive rational basis review because research shows these
indicators are related to educational outcomes.233 As the testtaking population continues to expand and diversify as a result of
“SAT School Day,”234 quantification is a reasonable means of
comparison because it allows admissions officials to view SAT
scores in context.235
The remaining criticisms relate to Landscape’s overSome question how
inclusivity and under-inclusivity.236
Landscape controls for low-income students living in wealthy
neighborhoods or attending charter schools.237
Others fear
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Landscape will misrepresent the disadvantage of wealthy
students zoned for schools with lower average family incomes.238
All of these concerns are valid. Landscape does not provide an
individualized review of a student’s financial situation.239
Nonetheless, the College Board does not view Landscape as an
ultimatum on college readiness.
Applicants have multiple
avenues to showcase how they have overcome individualized
hardship. Personal statements, diversity statements, and letters
of recommendation provide ample opportunity for students to
demonstrate how past experiences have contributed to their
academic development.
So long as admissions officials use Landscape as a
supplemental resource, its imperfections are not fatal under
rational basis review. Although Landscape may result in “some
inequality,” socioeconomic classifications do not require
“mathematical nicety.”240 Landscape “is a single metric, and like
any single metric, it will capture certain types of people and miss
others.”241 For some, this reality is a difficult pill to swallow.
Landscape is “to some extent both underinclusive and
overinclusive,”242 but would nevertheless survive an Equal
Protection challenge.
CONCLUSION
Landscape
raises important
questions
about
the
constitutionality of class-based affirmative action. In the past,
class-based affirmative action was solely an invention of legal
scholarship. However, Landscape will soon be made broadly
available to colleges and universities across the United States at
no cost to participating institutions. The College Board treads
uncharted waters as the admissions process becomes more
competitive and diverse, especially because of heightened
skepticism about traditional race-based affirmative action.
This Note addressed the likelihood of a successful Equal
Protection challenge to Landscape. Initially, the state action
requirement is satisfied because the College Board maintains a
virtual monopoly over college admissions and is “pervasively
entwined” with public educational institutions. On the merits,
238
239
240
241
242
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Landscape should receive rational basis review because
socioeconomic status and geographic locale are not suspect
classifications. Unlike race-based affirmative action programs,
Landscape will benefit from Kahlenberg’s “great legal irony.” To
withstand constitutional scrutiny, the College Board need only
show Landscape is rationally related to a legitimate purpose.
Because the Supreme Court has affirmatively recognized that
student body diversity is a compelling interest, it is surely
legitimate. Moreover, even if Landscape’s methodology is both
overinclusive and underinclusive, perfection is by no means
necessary to establish a rational relationship. Thus, despite its
various flaws, Landscape is ultimately constitutional.

